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Abstract
After almost half a century of negotiation, the Uruguay Round was concluded in 1994. The
WTO proclaimed as its basic goals the growth of the living standard, full employment, the
growth of production and trade, optimal use of world resources etc. Undoubtedly the world, as
a whole, will experience the rise of welfare. However, there is a serious doubt that the rules of
the WTO were formulated primarily for the sake of maximization welfare of the most
developed countries. Majority of the least developed countries will be faced with the reduced
welfare. Considering that the absence from the WTO implies potentially larger loses, the only
dilemma for these countries is the choice of strategy of accession to the WTO in order to
minimize their loses.
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2Whether the Rules of the WTO Will Broaden the Gap Between
the Most Developed and the Least Developed Countries?
1. Introduction
After almost half a century of negotiating and eight rounds of negotiations,
the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established on January 1st, 1995. The
goals1 of the WTO are almost identical to the goals of the GATT: higher living
standard and income, full employment, the growth of production and trade, as
well as optimal utilization of world resources, in accordance with the goals of
sustainable development and protection of environment.
In realization of these goals, the WTO proceeds from the principles of
non-discriminatory trade, predictable and expanding access to the markets,
promotion of fair competition, stimulation of development, economic reforms and
free trade.
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round was heralded as a major triumph for
international economy and a incresement of welfare for all countries. According
to the prediction of the WTO Secretariat, as the result of the world trade growth,
the world GDP may be increased for 230 billion US dollars at the end of the
period of implementation of all agreed concessions on liberalization (e.d. until
2005) only as the result of liberalization of the access to the commodities
markets.2
What is beyond any doubt and what most authors think is that the world, in
general, will experience the growth of well-being, as it can be seen from the
following table:
                                                                
1 The goals of the WTO are stated in the preamble of the Agreement on the Establishment of the
WTO.
2 Schott J. & Buurman J.W. - “The Uruguay Round - an Assessment”, 1996.
3Table 1. – Estimated effects of the UR on world GDP and Trade
Author GDP (US$ billions) World trade (in %)
Nguyen 212 20
Yang 116 14.8
WTO 230 12.4
OECD 274 n.a.
Goldin 213 n.a.
Source: “The Uruguay Round an Assessment”, 1996.
However, this table does not indicate the answer to the question (many
officials of the WTO were avoiding it as well) how these rules will affect the least
developed countries. There is a well founded suspicion that the WTO rules were
designed to maximize the welfare of the most developed countries and that
developing countries will be faced with further impoverishment, e.d. that the WTO
rules will broaden the gap between the most developed and least developed
countries.
2. The Imbalanced and Inequitable Outcome of the Uruguay Round
The WTO members enjoy automatically the clause of the most favoured
nation, while other countries may enjoy it only if they agree it on bilateral bases.
Without this clause, a non-discriminatory access to the international market is not
possible. However, the clause of the most favoured nation represents the
realization of the non-discrimination principle that suits developed market
economies.3 In the exchange with the third countries, developed market
economies apply the tariff rates which are a few times higher than the MFN
rates. It means that developing countries may have choice between high tariff
rates (that make their export incompetative) and the accession to the WTO.
However, the absence from the WTO carries with it possibilities of very large
loses.
                                                                
3 This is proved also by the fact that this clause is taken from the trade practice of the USA.
4The inclusion of some spheres in its scope, such as intellectual property,
investment rules, telecommunication etc., the WTO exceeded the character of
only a trade organization. There is a real apprehension that by the extension of
its rules to  new areas, the WTO may become supranational body under the
control of a few most developed countries which may dictate their conditions to
the economically weaker countries.4
In the process of admission of new members, the considerations of the
working group are not limited only to the segments of the economic system
regulating the sphere of economic relations with foreign countries, but, at the
same time, the whole economic system and the entirety of economic policy are
being re-examined.5
Though it is not within the mandate of the WTO regulations, a
considerable attention is paid to the examination of the issue of privatization.
The most vocal in putting up these demands are the USA which point out that the
WTO rules mean market economy whose normal functioning can not be
imagined without the existence of a large share of private companies. This issue
was raised by majority of the East European and by some developing countries
that have submitted application for the membership in the WTO. Behind this
demand is aspiration of multinational companies to buy off cheaply profitable
companies.6 When the WTO allowed that on the occasion of admission of new
members the issue of basic economic and system policies was raised, it is clear
that it is interference in the sovereignty of countries and the first step towards
some new form of neocolonialism.
The WTO rules foresee the obligatory adoption of all WTO agreements in
a package and without prolonged transition terms, though some of them will
negatively affect the welfare of developing countries.
Frequently raised dilemma is whether the WTO rules have an impact on
the reduction of national sovereignty. Namely, the WTO rules give certain rights
                                                                
4 One may expect that in the future on the agenda of the WTO will be also some rules on
competition, taxes, labor standards, government procurements and even the issue of human
rights.
5 Popovic T. and others. - “Jugoslavija i Svetska trgovinska organizacija”, 1996.
5to the signatories but, at the same time, obligations, which also have an impact
on actions of each country. There are also opinions that the WTO rules bring
about the extension of national sovereignty, as the companies will be protected
outside their mother country. However, as the rules were created under the
pressure of the most developed countries, and considering that they were
created for the maximization of their welfare, it is obvious that these rules have
an impact on reduction of sovereignty of the least developed countries.
Developing countries will be forced to change existing and adopt a number of
new laws in order to adapt themselves to the WTO rules. “According to several
analyses, the UR agreements will severely restrict or constrain the possible
policy options in many countries. Non-compliance of the rules can result in
complaints being brought against country, and threat of trade penalties and
retaliations through measures affecting trade and other activities.”7
Developed countries, in desire to perpetuate global domination and to
prevent the appearance of new competitors, imposed the ban on the export
subsidies. The exception is agriculture, under condition that it was subsidized in
the base period as well. It is almost impossible to withdraw once offered
concessions. This provision is very unfavorable for developing countries,
considering that owing to underdevelopment in many spheres, it is very hard to
determine the optimal level of concessions.
At the moment, some developed countries exert pressure that the WTO
should include into its agenda the negotiations on “government procurements”.
Considering that the potentially large profits are at stake, the goal of developed
countries is that for the “government procurements” the national treatment clause
applies as well. It would mean that the governments could not give preference to
domestic companies in case of large investment undertakings (for instance, the
construction of roads, bridges, schools, etc.).
The WTO could be also used as an instrument to shift a great portion of
the burden of future global economic adjustment (for instance, because of
                                                                                                                                                                                         
6 As in these countries there is  scarcity of domestic private capital that would take part in
privatization, the only real source is foreign capital.
7 “Focus on World Trade”, 2/98.
6enviromental imperatives). to the South, which presently has a very weak
bargaining and negotiating position in the WTO forum.
The rules on regional integrations are the best example that there may be
exemption to the WTO rules if it is in the interest of the most developed
countries. Though each form of integration is an exemption to the most favoured
nation clause, as the countries within a regional integration in their mutual
exchange apply lower (or zero) tariffs than those applied to other members of the
WTO, regional integrations are not banned by the WTO rules.8 The WTO itself, in
order to explain mass violation of its basic principle (the clause of the most
favoured nation) elucidates that the zones of preferential trade and the tariff union
(under the Art. 24 of the GATT) are not contrary to the general liberalization and
globalization.9 The following table illustrates best that the world is in the period of
mega regionalization:
Table 2. – The share of the most important regional agreements in world trade in
1997.
Regional agreement Share in world trade (in %)
EU 22.8
EUROMED 2.3
NAFTA 7.9
MERCOSUR 0.3
FTAA 1.3
AFTA 2.6
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZELAND 0.1
APEC 23.7
TOTAL 61
Source: “Fifty Years of the GATT/WTO: Lessons from the Past
for the Strategies for the Future”, 1998.
                                                                
8 According to the Art. 24 of the GATT (para 4) the establishment of the tariff union, the free
trade zone and transitional agreements leading to the establishment of the tariff union or the
zone of free trade should make easier the trade between participating countries, and to raise
barriers to the trade between these countries and other contracting parties.
9 Kovac O. - “Unutarbalkanska ekonomska saradnja i integracija”, 1998.
7It is obvious that the basic protagonist of regionalization are developed
countries, as it is clear that the rules of regional integrations are contrary to the
spirit of globalism which, at least declaratively, advocates the WTO.
As a relatively great achievement of the Uruguay Round sounds the
information that, as the result of implementation of the agreement, there may
come the average reduction of the MFN tariffs for 40% in developed market
economies. However, if one has in mind that the bulk of the least developed
countries export consists of raw-materials with zero or very low tariff rates, then it
is obvious that this reduction will not mean much to the least developed
countries.
3. Agricultural liberalization and UR
The Agreement on Agriculture foresees the tariffication, e.d.
transformation  of all non-tariff barriers, into the tariffs. The basis for the
tariffication represents the difference between domestic and world prices in the
period 1986-1988. Thus obtained tariffs are subject to reduction and
consolidation, e.d. they can not be later increased.
For developed countries the obligation of tariff cuts is 36% within 6 years,
while for developing countries the obligation of tariff cuts is 24% in 10 years.
Tariff cuts are average and they do not necessarily have to be linear for
each individual product. A minimum reduction for individual product is 15% for
developed and 10% for developing countries. The tariffs obtained by the
tariffication and their foreseen reduction are included in the list of concessions
which all members are obliged to submit to the WTO.
As far as domestic support are concerned, it was agreed to reduce them
for 20%, in total. At this, one has to take into account that the reduction does not
apply to individual product, but to the average reduction of domestic support.
As the result of the Uruguay Round, the tariffs were reduced for 36%, in
average. It sounds as a significant achievement, but this assertion is untenable if
one has in mind that this reduction applies only to the customs duty obtained by
8tariffication, what is considerably higher level. In many countries and for many
products, the tariff equivalents included in the list of concessions were much
higher than the tariff equivalents during initial period, what brought about the
phenomenon of the so-called “dirty” tariffication.10
One can see from the table that majority of countries - members of the
OECD used the tariffication procedure that resulted by much higher tariffs than
the foreseen tariff equivalents in the period 1986-1988.
Table3. - Comparison of estimated ad valorem tariff equivalent 1986 – 88. and tariffs
declared in country schedules
 Country Rice Wheat Sugar Dairy
Estimat
e 86-88
UR
base
Differ. Estimat
e 86-88
UR
base
Differ. Estimat
e 86-88
UR
base
Differ. Estimat
e 86-88
UR
base
Differ.
Australia 13.5 0.0 -13.5 0.7 0.0 -0.7 11.8 52.4 40.6 49.3 6.7 -42.6
Canada - 0.9 - 30 57.7 27.7 131 197 66 187 288.4 101.4
USA 1.0 5.0 4.0 20 6 -14 131 197 66 132 144 12
EU 153 360.5 207.5 103 155.6 52.6 234.0 297.
0
63.0 177 288.5 111.5
Japan 500 - - 651 239.6 -411 184 126.
1
-58 501 489.4 -11.6
New  Z. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.9 2.9 0 19.6 19.6
Austria 0 0 0 188 400 212 183 178 -5 196 463 267
Colomb. 4 210 206 20 138 118 25.3 130 104 - 150 -
Venez. 174.9 135 -39.9 - 130 - 47 100 53 - 96 -
Thailand 1 58 57 - 64 - - 104 - - 63 -
Rep of
Corea
213.8 - - - 10.9 - - 23.7 - 103.4 220 116
Czech R. 14 70 56 -38 16 54 14 70 56 -20 64 84
Source: “The Uruguay Round and Developing countries”, 1996.
Basic error that made possible the “dirty” tariffication came from the fact
that the countries themselves were allowed to determine the level of protection in
the basic period, without any control.
Developed countries took care to protect themselves from the massive
import by introduction of a special protective clause, allowing the use of
additional tariffs, above the agreed level. Implementation of this protection
                                                                
10 M. D., Ingo - “Has Agricultural Trade Liberalization Improved Welfare in the Least-Developed
countries? Yes”, 1997.
9clause11 was made easier by Dankel’s text.12 This provision is useless for the
most developing countries, though they run into deficit as they import only as
many products as they consider necessary
to feed their population. The provision allowing the ban on import under the
pretext of the population health protection, may become very easily the subject of
numerous abuses. This is confirmed by the example of the European Union from
1993, when the import of pork from the countries in transition (CIT) was
introduced due to pig-fever, or from 1997, when the import of beef from the CIT
was prohibited, owing to the “crazy cows” disease.
Considering that a direct consequence of implementation of the
Agreement on Agricultural Production will be the rise of agricultural products
price, one may draw a conclusion that it will increase the welfare of the countries
that have surplus in the international exchange of agricultural products and
decrease the welfare of the countries having deficit in that exchange.
The assessments done by the RUNS model have clearly shown that the
most affected were the poor countries, the net-importers of agricultural products.
However, the model clearly indicates that the total world gains are much larger
than the total world loses. Therefore, it would be necessary to elaborate certain
mechanism of compensation to the least developed countries, but for this there
is no political will.
World Bank has also stood in protection of developed countries. Thus, for
instance, the PRWP No. 1748, “Has Agricultural Trade Liberalization Improved
Welfare in the Least Developed Countries? Yes”, in addition to the suggestive
title, tries to shift all blame to developing countries. On the binding of this
publication it has been pointed out: “Most of the gains from multilateral
liberalization come from the countries own liberalization efforts. Least-developed
countries that failed to liberalize their trade policy lost the opportunity for gains
that the UR made possible.” However, the assessments of  I. Goldin (presented
                                                                
11 The level of activation of the protection clause depends on the level of free access. At this, the
average rate of import in the last three years is compared with total consumption. The higher
access, the lower level on which this clause is activated. The use of this clause does not require
the proof that domestic producers suffer loses.
12 A. Dankel was General Director of the GATT.
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in the work itself) have clearly indicated that the Agreement on Agriculture will
result in reduction of the welfare of the least developed countries.
Table 4. – Impact of the Agricultural Agreement on GDP of Least –Developed Countries
Countries I scenario II scenario Countries I scenario II scenario
Bangladesh -00,2 -0,05 Madagascar 0,01 0,11
Benin -0,10 -0,011 Malawi 0,13 0,63
Bhutan -0,03 -0,19 Maldives 0,27 -0,42
Botswana 0,00 0,04 Mali -0,17 -0,01
Burkina Faso -0,07 0,00 Mauritania -0,10 -0,52
Burundi 0,01 0,16 Mozambique -0,09 -0,39
Cambodia 0,02 -0,03 Maynamr 0,00 0,01
Central African
Republic
-0,04 -0,04 Namibia -0,05 -0,04
Chad -0,15 0,09 Nepal 0,00 -0,04
China -0,01 0,02 Nicaragua 0,03 0,40
Comoros -0,06 -0,29 Niger -0,06 -0,16
Egypt -0,11 -0,33 Nigeria -0,02 -0,09
Equatorial
Guinea
-0,06 -0,25 Pakistan -0,04 -0,04
Ethiopia -0,05 -0,05 Rwanda 0,02 0,07
Gambia -0,15 -1,19 Sao Tome &
Principe
-0,16 -0,46
Ghana -0,8 -0,10 Sierra Leone 0,07 -0,38
Guinea -0,03 -0,37 Solomon
Islands
0,11 0,01
Guinea-Bissau 0,01 -0,35 Somalia -0,10 -0,34
Guyana 0,78 4,66 Sri Lanka -0,02 -0,05
Haiti -0,06 -0,45 Sudan -0,08 0,01
Honduras -0,15 0,36 Tanzania -0,03 0,15
India 0,00 0,03 Togo -0,10 -0,07
Indonesia 0,01 0,01 Uganda 0,00 0,15
Kenya 0,01 0,14 Viet Nam -0,01 0,18
Lao PDR -0,03 -0,04 Yemen -0,10 -0,43
Lesotho 0,02 -0,62 Zaire -0,02 -0,06
Liberia 0,06 -0,16 Zimbabwe 0,06 -0,02
Source: “Has Agricultural Trade Liberalization Improved Welfare in the Least Developed
Countries? Yes”
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From the table one can clearly see that, by the first scenario, the GDP will
be reduced in 34 countries and that it will be increased only in 15 countries (in 5
countries there will be no change). According to the other scenario, the GDP will
be also reduced in 34 countries and increased in 19 countries (in one country
there will be no change).
Considering that the issue here is the segment of consumption which is
inelastic, the rise of prices will not have significant influence on the reduction of
demand. It means that the result will be unchanged (or slightly reduced) import
(quantitatively expressed) and increased value of import due to the rise of prices
of agricultural products.
4. The TRIPs Agreement
The agreement on  trade related aspects of the intellectual property rights
regulates in a uniformed way the intellectual property rights. This agreement
provides implementation of the national treatment and the most favoured nation
clauses. The following table illustrates which types of intellectual property are the
subject of protection.
Table 5. - The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
The type of intellectual property The subject of protection Duration of protection
Copyright and related rights Ideas, realization and
methods of work
The life time of an
individual or 50 years
Trademarks Marks, letters, numbers end
their combination
The renewal of the trade
mark registration,
minimum 7 years
Geographical indications Geographical origin of
products
Unlimited
Industrial models and samples Ornamental features of
products
Minimum 10 years
Patents Products, processes Minimum 20 years
Trade secrets The data having
commercial value
Unlimited
Developed countries have to comply with the provisions of this agreement
within a year, developing countries within 5 years and the least developed
12
countries within 10 years, with the possibility of extension of this period. It is
indisputable that great economic interests are involved in this sphere. Almost
entire exchange of goods and services is performed under license, patent or
trade mark. The absence of the intellectual property protection acts as a non-
tariff barrier for exporters, as one has to take into account additional expenses
for prevention of illegal infringement of authors’ rights.
For some companies the payment of copyrights would mean only
increased expenses, and for the other ones - the end of business activities. If the
market structure is characterized by the existence of the dual structure between
the domestic and foreign companies, which is transformed in a monopoly (by
elimination of domestic company that did not respect the protection of intellectual
property rules), then there arise significant economic loses, as a consequence of
the reduction of consumer surplus.
The result of this agreement will probably be also the expansion of the
developing countries imports, as in some fields the only suppliers will be foreign
companies (for instance: software). Actually, there will be an expansion of
expenses for the purchase of patents, licenses etc. from foreign companies.
If one assumes that this agreement will last, it will result on the developing
countries markets in two ways: on one hand, by eliminating imitators, on the
market will remain only “original” products which are, as a rule, more expensive,
and that may lead to the reduction of demand for that type of product.13 On the
other hand, considering that there will be only original products on the market,
demand for them will expand. The end result will be a reduction of sale of that
type of product and the expansion of sale of the “original” one. It means that it will
be on the detriment of the country introducing protection of intellectual property.
Having in mind that the object of imitation is most frequently produced
with very high expenses of research, which proportionally have a small share in
overall production of developing countries, e.d., considering that imitation of
products is more frequent on the markets of developing countries than their
products, it is obvious that the final result of this agreement will affect adversely
13
the welfare of developing countries and increase the welfare of developed
market economies.
Undoubtedly, this agreement will actually mean the transfer of the rent
from underdeveloped to developed countries, but its adverse effects are partially
reduced by the relatively long period of adaptation, left to developing countries.
There are also some assessments pointing out that in the case of this
agreement, the loss of the welfare in developing countries may be greater than
the gains of developed countries. Developed countrie¢º motives for introducing
trade-related intellectual property rights in the round were to enable their firms to
capture more profits through monopolistic higher prices, and through rozalities
and the sale of technology products; and to place stiff bariers preventing the
tehnological development od potential new rivals from the South.
5. A Proposed Solution for Negotiating the Accession of the Developing
countries into the WTO
The best alternative to the developing countries accession to the WTO
would be the granting of a transition period (minimum 10 years and to the least
developed countries even longer). The goal of transition period would be to give
developing countries a certain period for implementation of necessary reforms,
for restructuring their domestic economies and for defining (or implementation)
their economic policy that would have credibility, both in the country and abroad.
Developing countries would enjoy in this transition period all privileges
resulting from the membership in the WTO and which, at the same time, would
not be obliged to extend any concessions during the transition period. They
would be only obliged to implement the program of economic reforms that would
be monitored by a certain body of the WTO. At the end of transition period,
developing countries would have to accept all obligations originating from the
WTO agreement.
                                                                                                                                                                                         
13 Demand for the type of  product includes the demand for the original product (the product
covered by the protection of intellectual property) and illegally imitated product.
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The transition period differs from granting a special treatment. First,
granting the transition period requires implementation of certain reforms that
granting of a special status does not. Second, at the end of transition period, the
country gets full membership and undertakes all obligations. In this way,
developing countries have also a period of time to establish a realistic level of
concessions.
Granting a transition period would not mean a precedent in the history of
international economic relations. For instance, the Treaty on Accession of Spain,
Greece, Portugal, Sweden, Austria and Finland to the European Union, the
European agreements between the EU and developing countries, the NAFTA
grants special arrangements for all three member states etc.14 In the GATT itself
there were similar transition periods. For instance, the Agreement Between
Yugoslavia and GATT from 1959. had a provision that stipulated annual
meetings for monitoring the progress that would lead to full membership of
Yugoslavia to the GATT.15
For granting a transition period there are also legal provisions in the Final
Act of the Uruguay Round. They are based on the provision that the Ministerial
Conference may, by three quarters majority, exempt any country from any
obligation that may proceed from the Agreement. However, for that there is no
political will of the most developed countries.
***
The least-developing countries have been put in a situation in which they
already paid the price of accepting new terms in different areas of interest the
industrialized countries, without obtaining in exchange satisfactory conditions of
market access. Considering that a non-discriminatory access to foreign markets
without the membership in the WTO is almost impossible, developing countries
                                                                
14 USA have transition period for professional services, air and road transport etc. from 2-7 years;
Canada has a transition period for automotive industry, a number of business services and air
transport from 2-5 years; Mexico has transition period for telecommunications, business
services, air and road transport, etc. from 2-7 years.
15 Z. Drabek - “The Stability of Trade Policy in the CIT and their Integration into the Multilateral
Trading System”, 1996.
15
have to join the WTO.16 Those developing countries that have not jet joined the
WTO must, with great care, make right choice of concessions in order to
minimize potential loses.
References
1. Baldwin E. R. - “An Economic Evaluation of the Uruguay Round” - The World
Economy: Global Trade Policy  - Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 1995.
2. Berry C. R. - “The Global Economy in Transition” - Prentice Hall, USA
1997.
3. Drabek Z. - "The Stability of Trade Policy in the Countries in Transition and
their Integration into the Multilateral Trading System" - The World Economy -
Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 1996.
4. Finger M. and others - "The Uruguay Round: Statistics on Tariff
Concessions Given and Received" -  World Bank, Washington DC 1996.
5. Harrison W.G., Rutherford F.T and Tarr G.D. - “Quantifying the Uruguay
Round” - Economic Journal, Sept. 1997.
6. Hertel T. and others - "Growth, Globalization, and Gains from the Uruguay
Round" - Policy Research Working Paper 1614, World Bank ,Washington
DC,1996.
7. Ingo D. Merlinda - "Has Agricultural Trade Liberalization Improved Welfare in
the Least - Developed Countries? Yes" - Policy Research Working Paper
1748, World Bank, Washington DC,1997.
8. Jackson  J. - “The World Trade Organization: Watershed Innovation or
Cautious Small Step Forward” - The World Economy - Blackwell Publishers,
Oxford 1995.
9. Kovac O. – “Unutarbalkanska ekonomska saradnja i integracija” –
savetovanje “Procesi regionalne saradnje na Balkanu”, Nis, 1998.
                                                                
16 The absence from the membership in the WTO would surely lead developing countries to
larger loses than their membership in the WTO.
16
10. Martin Will & Winter L. Alan - “The Uruguay Round and the Developing
countries” - Cambridge University Press, 1996.
11. Popovic T. redactor - “Finalni akt Urugvajske Runde” - Institut
ekonomskih nauka, Beograd 1995.
12. Popovic T. redaktor - “Jugoslavija i Svetska trgovinska organizacija” -
Institut ekonomskih nauka, Beograd 1996.
13. Schott J.  - “WTO 2000: Setting the Course for World Trade” - Institute
for International Economics, Washington DC 1996.
14. Schott J. & Buurman J. W. - “The Uruguay Round - an Assessment” -
Institute for International Economics, Washington DC 1996.
15. Singh H and others - "Some New Evidence on Determinants of Foreign
Direct Investment in Developing Countries"-Policy Research Working Paper
1531, Washington DC 1995.
16. Svetlicic M. and Singer H. - “The World Economy - Challenges of
globalization and regionalism” - Macmillan press, London 1996.
17. Trajcevska R. - "Urugvajskata Runda na pregovori i trgovijata so zemjodelski
proizvodi"-Godisnik na Ekonomskiot fakultet, Skopje 1997.
18. Winters A. – “Regionalism versus Multilateralism” – Policy Research
Working Paper 1687, World Bank, Washington DC, 1996.
19. World Trade Organization - “GATT Activities 1994-1995”, Geneva 1996.
20. World Trade Organization – “Regionalism and the Multilateral Trading
System, 1998.
21. World Trade Organization – “Fifty Years of the GATT/WTO: Lessons from the
Past for the Strategies for the Future”, 1998.
22. World Trade Organization – “Focus on World Trade”, 2/98
23. World Bank - "Global Economic Prospects and the Developing
Countries" - Washington DC 1997.
24. World Bank – “Widening and Deepening the World Trading System” – World
Bank Policy Research Bulletin, volume 6, number 5, 1995.
25. World Bank – “The Uruguay Round: winners and winners” – World Bank
Policy Research Bulletin, volume 6, number 1, 1995.
